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I
Sartre, phenomenology 
and the study 
of social existence
by
Eleni Mahaira-Odoni, Ph. D.
Department of Political Science, 
Boston University
The following discussion is concerned with the pres­
entation and critical evaluation of the major themes 
which Jean-Paul Sartre’s Critique de la raison dia­
lectique has contributed to the growth of a radical 
phenomenology.1 The present work is based on a 
lengthier study,2 which, on the whole, conflicts with 
the great majority of commentaries addressed to the 
Critique. Our contention here is that Sartre has under­
taken a critical reconstruction of the meaning of 
social existence at its most immediate level for the 
purpose of revealing that the praxis of concrete his­
torical sutjects can be the only foundation of the 
materialist dialectic.
The term «revealing» is used here in a double sense: 
First, it designates the essential function of phenom­
enology which is to render phenomenal, or bring 
to light the meaning of human existence hidden under­
neath social and/or intellectual schemata. And sec­
ondly, this process of revelation is applied to the 
dialectic of history which has always presupposed the 
need for understanding man but which has grown in­
creasingly impervious to his truth. Phenomenology 
then serves Sartre as a critical tool for freeing the 
historical dialectic from the quasi-metaphysical dis­
tortions generated by deterministic Marxism and for 
identifying the quest for historical knowledge and 
truth with the study of «praxis,» i. e., of man as a 
social being, the producer in history and of history 
under definite circumstances. In Sartre’s own words:
In the last analysis I consider the materialist dialectic as 
the only mode of conceiving historical evolution. If I have written 
a book on it, it was not in order to modify it but in order to try 
and see whether I could liberate it from a much too often er­
roneous usage and how I could restore to it its clarity, that is 
essentially the transparency—yet ungiven though postulated 
—between man and tran.s
In different terms, without disputing the significance 
of the socio-economic forces and relations comprising
1. Jean-Pau! Sartre, Critique de la raison dialectique (précédé 
de «Questions de méthode»), Tome I: Théorie des ensembles 
humains (Paris: Gallimard, 1960). «Questions of Method», 
the opening section of the book, is the only part that has been 
translated into English under the title Search for a Method. 
H. Barnes, trans. (New York: Vintage Books, 1968). For 
purposes of convenience, most references to the English text 
are cited here as SFAM while those from the main body of 
the Critique are cited as CRD.
2. Eleni Mahaira-Odoni, Sartre’s Contribution to the Phe­
nomenology of Marxism (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, 
Department of Political Science, Boston University, January 
1974).
3. Fiom a conference given by Sartre in Rome in 1961, pub­
lished only in Italian as «Soggettività e marxismo» by the phi­
losophical review Aut Aut, No. 136-7 (luglio-ottobre 1973), 
p. 157. My translation.
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the historical dialectic, our contention here is that 
Sartre attempts a phenomenological examination of 
the meaning and the «constitution» that praxis must 
encompass in order that the root of the dialectic 
be not an abstract «Reason» or «History» or «Na­
ture» but man himself.
This point of view is clearly opposed to that of the 
literature addressed to the Critique from a herme­
neutic angle which is largely prescriptive. With the 
exception of minor disagreements as to the success 
of Sartre’s undertaking, most critics concur that the 
purpose of the Critique is to synthesize Marxism with 
his previous existentialism. They claim that Sartre 
seeks either to commit the individual to social action 
and /or to build an alternative prototype to Marx’s 
revolutionary model.1
In contrast, the position outlined here draws its 
support from Sartre’s methodological point of de­
parture which has been largely ignored by the fore­
going lines of interpretation. Our thesis is that unless 
the relationship between phenomenology, as an exis­
tential method, and historical materialism is placed 
in a proper perspective, the scope and the content 
of the Critique become completely incomprehensible.
It is impossible to do justice to the Wealth of issues 
treated by the Critique in an essay of this size. Ac­
cordingly, this study will undertake a discussion of 
some of the basic questions raised by the Critique in 
conjunction with the phenomenological approach to the 
study of history and social existence. We will begin 
first, with an exposition of the relationship between 
phenomenology and the historical dialectic in order 
to provide the general framework of Sartre’s inquiry. 
Then we will turn to the idea of scarcity and its effect 
upon the simplest conceivable life-world. Following 
a short discussion on Sartre’s theory of alterity which 
is a theory of practically oriented consciousness, 
this essay will close with some brief observations 
on class-existence in the light of the alterity hypothe­
sis.
1. Among the many works that have dealt with the Critique 
and have treated it as a fusion of existentialist ontology and 
Marxism, cf. Aron, R., Marxism and the Existentialists (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1965); Audry, Colette, Sartre et la réalité 
humaine (Paris: Seghers, 1966); Burnier, M.—A., Choice of 
Action (New York: Random House, 1968); Desan W., The 
Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre (New York: Doubleday, 1965); 
Maiill-Albérès, R., Sartre (Paris: Éditions universitaires, 
1967); Odajnyk, W., Marxism and Existentialism (New York: 
Doubleday, F65); Sheridan, J. F., Jr., Sartre: The Radical Con­
version (Ohio: Ohio Univ., Press, 1969); Jameson, F., Marxism 
and Form (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1971); 
McBride, W. L., Fundamental Change in Law and Society. 
Hart and Sartre on Revolution (The Hague: Mouton 1970); 
McMahon, J. H., Humans Being: The World of Jean-Paul 
Sartre (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971) and 
Molnar, T. S., Sartre: Ideologue of Our Time (New York: 
Funk & Wagnalls, 1968).
II
It seems best to begin with a discussion of phenom­
enology first, in relation to Sartre and then, to the 
historical dialectic so that we can move afterwards to 
some of the substantive results emerging from this 
approach. There are two reasons warranting this 
initial excursion into the relevance of phenomenology: 
first, though the method as well as the philosophical 
starting point of radical phenomenology—the mean­
ing of concretely lived social existence—constitute 
the focus of the Critique, Sartre mentions phenomen­
ology only once, in a footnote! In other words, Sartre 
uses many terms to characterize the word—he speaks 
of a «reflexive» or «comprehensive» ctitique which 
uses the «ideology of existence» and the method of an 
«analytical regression» and of a critique which aims 
at «rational non-knowledge.» These are indeed phe­
nomenological terms, but they are also part of «or­
dinary» philosophical discourse. As a result, only 
among phenomenologists in Sartre’s work recog­
nized for what it is.2 However, in support of Sartre’s 
choice of terms, we note that though there is little 
disagreement among phenomenologists concerning 
the methods of the field, the scope of phenomenology 
is often at issue: Sartre is not interested in phenom­
enology as a «theory of meaning» but rather in its 
radical aspect as a «philosophy of being»—a trend 
that Husserl himself encouraged sufficiently in his 
late period work.3
This brings us to the second reason for considering 
the importance of phenomenology in Sartre’s en­
terprise. Not only does he use eclectic phenomenolog-
2. Cf. Spiegelberg, H., The Phenomenological Movement 
Vol. II (The Hague: M. Nijhoff (1971), p. 449. Also, Paci, Enzo, 
Funzione delle scienze e significato dell’uomo (Milano, 1964), 
p. 347 ff.
3. Cf. Natanson, M., Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of In­
finite Tasks (Evanston, 111: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1973). 
In support of this transcendental direction in Husserl’s The 
Crisis of European Sciences, see Rovatti, P.A., «Marcuse and 
The Crisis...» in Telos, No. 1 (Spring 1968), pp. 113-5, and es­
pecially the Paci work, op.cit., as a whole. The present work 
which originated in the USA, had to concentrate heavily on the 
analytic-synthetic character of Sartre’s work before its fruits— 
subjectivity and the role of alterity—could be approached. 
The few notable exceptions among North Americans who 
recognize the validity of the bond between phenomenology 
and historical materialism cannot fill the gap. Cf. James M. 
Edie, «Sartre as Phenomenologist and as Existential Psychoa­
nalyst»; Lee, E.N. and Mandelbaum, M., Phenomenology and 
Existentialism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967); John 
O’Neill, «Introduction» to Hyppolite, Jean, Studies on Marx 
and Hegel (New York: Basic Books, 1969). In contrast, we 
find that European philosophers and especially the Italians Paci 
and Rovatti and the German Klaus Hartmann, have called 
wide attention to the stature of the CRD, perhaps more so 
than in France where, of course, Sartre has had to share the 
stage with the structuralists.
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ical categories (such as, «the project», «transcen­
dence,» «subjectivity,» the «other», etc.) which are 
already part of his old existentialist vocabulary; the 
meager English edition of the Critique (1 /7 of the 
original) further complicates matters through an 
inadequate introduction and a misrepresentation 
of at least 2 key-terms: critique réflexive and I’inter- 
monde. «Reflexion», the principle of all phenomenol­
ogical methodology, is aimed at the study of the 
stream of consciousness through experiential struc­
tures of consciousness itself.1 We will return to a 
fuller consideration of Sartre’s views on reflexion 
but for the moment the point is that reflexion is not 
just another synonym for «thought.»
Also, the phenomenological «intermonde» bears 
no relation to ancient Epicurean terminology;1 2 
it refers instead to the «life-world»—what Husserl 
calls das Lebenswelt. The life-world is the everyday 
world in which we all live and operate, in accordance 
with an «unscientific» but comprehensive and fairly 
coherent valuation of our position, needs and deeds. 
Insofar as the life-world comprises the source of all 
human pursuits, phenomenological inquiry posits 
the study of its constitution (i.e., how it is shaped 
by us and what it therefore means for us) as a pri­
mary task.
This means that a phenomenological inquiry into 
the life-world (the «reflexive» procedure) entails 
a «going-backwards» from the objective world as 
described by the categories of the social sciences 
to another level of objectivity, where the world is made 
by concrete actors according to their own conception 
of what constitutes their (objective) situation.3 In 
Sartre’s own words:
1. E. Husserl, Ideas, 78a. Trans, by W. R. Boyce Gibson 
(New Yoik: Collier Books, 1972). H. Barnes translates Sartre’s 
réflexion and réflexive as «reflection» and «reflective.» The 
terms are not incorrect but I prefer reflexion because it seems 
freer of contemplative implications—as the case of a «reflex­
ive verb.»
2. In translating l'intermonde, H. Barnes gives the... Larousse 
definition of «an Epicurean concept of space between the 
two worlds»! SFAM, p. 76. P. Piccone summarizes the Husser- 
lian Lebenswelt as follows:
«The Lebenswelt is that domain of experience which is both 
precategorical and categorical.... It involves the preconceptual 
apprehension of reality, the sorting out of concepts needed 
to abstract certain crucial features of that reality, and the con­
ceptualizing of those features of reality deemed relevant, i.e., 
determined as essential in relation to some telos itself given to 
us as need in the Lebesnwelt··.. It is also the domain in which 
concepts are invented and historical projects are formulated.... 
All of Husserl’s account is meant to uncover the transcendental 
subjectivity which generated these concepts and which is con­
stantly repressed in mundane experience, i. e., the alienated 
experience of every day life under certain socio-historical con­
ditions». In «Phenomenological Marxism,» Telos, no 9 (Fall 
1971), pp. 21-5.
3. On the synthesis of the phenomenological-regressive me­
thod, cf. SFAM, p. 52n.
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I recognize that I havejsought to elaborate a philosophy 
of reflexion, not in a sense where reflexion would be the spirit 
reflecting on itself, but rather a philosophy which, through 
the mediation of reflexion, seeks to define, at the level of some 
distance from it, the person and the social group in their ob­
jectivity by starting from subjectivity. In fact, this is an analytical 
regression which must afterwards lead to the synthetic progres­
sion, to history and thus to the real and specific role of subjec­
tivity.4
It is now almost certain that Sartre will never per­
form the «synthetic progression» he had planned 
as a second volume of the Critique since he now 
seems to have lost his eyesight.5 Nonetheless, our 
goal here is to show that as it stands, the Critique re­
presents a valuable example of «oriented» phenom­
enological analysis; that is, a regression into the 
meaning of the life-world—into the constitution of 
what men perceive as the material and ideational con­
tent of their world in the course, and within the frame­
work of a history that evolves dialectically. More­
over, insofar as this composite phenomenological- 
materialist approach is aimed at understanding human 
consciousness, Sartre’s Critique and many of his 
subsequent writings stand as constant reminders 
of the one dimension that social science has practical­
ly forgotten—man himself.
Ill
Sartre’s turn to the phenomenological method as an 
instrument for concretizing the general categories 
of historical materialism resulted from the dilemma 
of finding himself caught between two idealisms— 
those of a rootless existentialism and of a mechanis­
tic, deterministic Marxism. On the one hand, by the 
late nineteen-forties Sartre was already disenchanted 
with the manner in which the ontology of L’Etre et le 
Néant had treated the problems of subject-object dual­
ism. On the other, having rejected the positivist 
point of view, he became convinced that there was little 
in common between Marx’s ideas and the ideological­
ly frozen, «scientific» brand of materialism that 
French-speaking Marxists Were dispensing.6
In the hands of Soviet-practice apologists and neo­
naturalists, Marx’s heuristic approach toward the 
abstract categories of political economy was remolded 
into a «science» of immutable laws and processes. 
Thus, the major thrust of historical materialism, i.e., 
the idea that behind pseudo-concrete categories lay
4. From the 1961 Rome conference on «Soggettività e 
marxismo», op. cit., p. 158.
5. «Sartre at Seventy: An Interview,» The New York Re­
view of Books, Vol. XXII, No. 13 (August 15, 1975), p. 10.
6. «There are two ways to fall into idealism: the one consists 
of dissolving the real in subjectivity; the other in denying all 
real subjectivityi n the interests of objectivity.» SFAM, p. 33. 
Cf. also pp. 18-21.
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nothing other than real, human, socio-economic re­
lations, was reduced to an idealist dogma that ignored 
entirely the need for deeper understanding of human 
praxis and consciousness.1 In effect, says Sartre, 
Marx himself used the phenomenological method in 
regressing from the superficiality of economic con­
cepts to the network of actual social relations that such 
concepts presupposed.1 2 In other words, as a number 
of social scientists have suggested, the validity of 
Marx’s philosophical concepts—human essence, 
objectification, alienation, etc.— was grounded in 
his concrete, i.e., economic research which Was ac­
tually premised on such concepts.3
Sartre’s insight into the problems generated by the 
ideology of «orthodox» Marxism was by no means 
original. The need for revitalizing the humanist 
dimension occluded by determinism had already point­
ed to phenomenology as one of the most crucial 
mediations since Marcuse’s work in the late nineteen- 
twenties.4 And yet, in Sartre’s case, the persist­
ence of the deterministic-idealist climate among 
French intellectuals5 moved him even farther from 
trying to understand the real meaning of the historical 
dialectic. Already a practicing disciple of Husserl 
(however idiosyncratic6), he used phenomenology’s 
preoccupation with reality to absolutize and, thus,
1. Cf. the contrast between «Marxists» and Marx in Sartre’s 
following statement:
«Marxist formalism is a project of elimination. The method 
is identical with the Terror in its inflexible refusal to differen­
tiate', its goal is total assimilation at the least possible effort.... 
Marx was so far from this false universality that he attempted 
to generate his knowledge dialectically in man, rising pro­
gressively from the broadest determinations to the most 
precise.» Ibid., pp. 50-1.
2. Ibid., pp. 48-51. Cf. also, Paci, E., op. cit., pp. 410-11, 
414. On Marx’s regressive method with respect to the study 
of history, cf. also, Domarchi, Jean, Marx et l’histoire 
(Paris: Eaitions de l’Herne, 1972), p. 47.
3. Cf. also, Mandel, Ernest, The Formation of the Economic 
Thought of Karl Marx (New York & London: Monthly Re­
view Press, 1971), pp. 209-10 et passim', Mészâros, I., Marx’s 
Theory of Alienation (London: Merlin Press, 1972), pp. 230-2.
4. For a concise exposition of this trend, cf. P. Piccone, 
op. cit., pp. 7-8. He continues with a brief sketch of theorists 
from Marcuse to Kojève, Kosik, Tran due Thao, Henri Lefeb­
vre, Merleau-Ponty, etc.
5. Among them, Sartre includes Lukâcs and comments 
incisively that the latter’s objective idealism (as opposed to 
his own subjectivist brano) was equally incapable of renewing 
historical materialism. SFAM, p. 21.
6. When Sartre claims affinity with Husserl and a dissocia­
tion from Heidegger {ibid., pp. 38-9; 15), he still stands on their
difference on the issue of the «pure ego». Of course this does 
not make him less than a good phenomenologist: in H. Spie-
gelberg’s opinion, in phenomenology Sartre «outranks any
other French thinker,» op. cit., p. 449. Cf. also, James M. Edie,
op. cit., pp. 141-9; A. Gurwitsch, «Problems of the Life-World»
in M. Natanson, ed., Phenomenology and Social Reality (The
Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1970), pp. 39-40.
render existentialism’s inquiry into human reality 
abstract.7
Eventually, in the nineteen-fifties Sartre came to 
the realization that on the one hand, existentialism 
as an ideology should be superceded while on the 
other, the only way that existentialism could wither in 
this Aufhebung was through its «inoculating» the 
equally hopeless historical materialism which had 
initially bred it.8 In other words, the «ideology of 
existence» and its phenomenological method was to 
serve as a mediation for divesting historical materi­
alism from the abstract, «commodity-type» character 
it had acquired.9
But this is not the only role that the method of 
existentialism was called upon to play. Sartre was not 
alone in believing that,all theoretical aberrations aside, 
Marx’s work itself was in earnest need of further 
concretization with respect to its «real-life» or 
«anthropological» foundations.10 *Sartre concedes 
that positivist-oriented social sciences as well as 
structuralist anthropology and sociology have con­
tributed greatly to the understanding of a historical 
process marked by human products and objects of 
all types. Yet, the social sciences have still to really 
teach us something about the men who make objects 
and whose lives are in turn shaped by them. Thus,
The true role of the «ideologies of existence» is not to de­
scribe an abstract «human reality» which has never existed, 
but constantly to remind anthropology of the existential di­
mension of the processes studied. Anthropology studies only 
objects. Now man is the being by whom becoming-an-object 
comes to man. Anthropology will deserve its name only if it 
replaces the study of human objects by the study of the va­
rious processes of becoming-an-object.11
Precisely because historical materialism provides 
the «only possible anthropology which can be at once 
historical and structural»,12 it must come to terms
7. Cf. SFAM, pp. 18-21, 28, 31, 37, 52-3 and 136.
8. Ibid., p. xxxiv, 8.
9. Ibid., p. 179. The notion that ideas too can function as 
commodities when they are produced in the interest of a ruling 
ideological or scientific system and are thus devoid of all hu­
man content and value is one of Sartre’s most incisive formula­
tions. He calls these idealist constructs «idea-objects» and 
returns to them again in the main body of the Critique (cf. 
also, SFAM, p. 33n, 68, 83, 163 and CRD, pp. 301-2, 343-5). 
Therefore, P. Piccone’s comment about the supposed «under­
development» of this notion in the text remains unwarranted. 
op. cit., p. 17. Notice also that Sartre’s point of view closely 
parallels Husserl’s critique of «the crisis of European sciences» 
for identical reasons.
10. SFAM, p. 52 ff., 133, 137, 143, 165, et passim. In this 
connexion, witness the works of Rovatti, Paci, H. Lefebvre and 
Kosik among the many Marxist-oriented theoreticians seeking 
to ground the validity of the historical dialectic in the life-world 
and especially in daily life.
11. Ibid., p. 174.
12. Ibid., pp. 174-5.
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with the pre-categorical foundations of political econo­
my, i.e., with the structure of the parameters within 
which human praxis creates decisions, values, needs 
and history itself. «The methodological principle 
which holds that certitude begins with reflexion in 
no way contradicts the anthropological principle 
which defines the concrete person by his materiality,» 
explains Sartre.1 Phenomenology is admirably suited 
to stand as a «moment» in the renewal of the dialectic, 
to the degree that it aims at «constituting the causes» 
of praxis, that is the internal dependencies encounter­
ed and created by subjects in the course of praxis 
that seeks to unify its world.1 2
At this point it becomes obvious that in his Critique 
— and since then, upon numerous occasions — 
Sartre is voicing some crucial philosophical objec­
tions regarding the scope and method of the social 
sciences, or what he calls «anthropology».3 More 
specifically, the structuralist approach to the human 
sciences, insofar as it claims a positive contribution 
to the elucidation of a dialectical human history, re­
mains until today Sartre’s main object of attack. 
Against the structuralists (from Lévi-Strauss, Al­
thusser, Pouillon, to Lacan, Foucault, the «Tel 
Quel» and the «Quinzaine» groups), Sartre has 
counterposed a consistently Marxian point of view 
which, in essence, defies the reduction of praxis to an 
object, no matter how alienated in its result. In other 
words, despite the fact that in our history praxis 
is more often than not «detotalized»—stripped of its 
unity and its organic relation to a projected tel os— 
and becomes engulfed in all kinds of socio-economic 
«structures,» praxis is the backbone of historical 
events.4 To ontologize totalities (structures) because 
they lend themselves to «scientific» (analytical) study 
and to remove the living subjects from the analysis 
of processes à la Althusser et al, is to disregard the 
fundamental claim of historical materialism whereby 
men make circumstances to the same degree that 
circumstances make men. As a dialectic, history 
makes sense only if human praxis is a totalization, in- 
teriorizing the external and re-exteriorizing the in­
1. Ibid., p. 32, n. 9.
2. Sartre asserts that when knowledge is placed once again 
on the proper anthropological foundation, i. e., on man’s pra­
xis, «existentialism will no longer have any reason for being. 
Absorbed, surpassed, and conserved»—as only a moment 
can be—«by the totalizing movement of philosophy, it will 
cease to be a particular inquiry and it will become the foundation 
of all inquiry.» Ibid., p. 181. On the necessity for avoiding a 
forced synthesis between phenomenology and historical ma­
terialism and for confronting the former as a «moment» of the 
latter, see P. Piccone, op. cit., pp. 11-2.
3. Cf. for example his «L’Anthropologie», Cahiers de Phi­
losophie, No. 2, republished in Situations IX (Gallimatd, 
1972) together with other related articles. See also Situations 
VIII (Gallimard, 1972).
4. SFAM, pp. 77-8.
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ternal: this can only mean that the relationship (dia­
lectical) between «conditions» and «actors» in his­
tory does not originate from History or Matter 
(Nature) but from man in his necessary relation to 
Nature.5 In sum, structures do not make history, 
neither do economic contradictions; men make it 
and if indeed they make it «badly,» if their totaliza­
tions are lost in petrified structures and processes, 
then men and, above all, their consciousness are the 
great unknowns.®
In this connexion, Sartre holds that the relation­
ship between exteriority and interiority in history 
is predominantly «anti-dialectical.»7 This means that 
human consciousness (interiority) is strongly de­
flected from a clear perception of its needs and goals 
because of a faulty awareness of the precise meaning 
of its objective condition; as a result of this extero- 
conditioning from surrounding processes, human 
consciousness, which is dependent upon exteriority 
for its direction translates itself into praxis which 
both reproduces and alters the internal complexion 
of such processes. Thus, «praxis-process» is «anti- 
dialectical» in the sense that it results in a minimal 
realization of human telos.8 Nonetheless, precisely 
because human consciousness is indeed engraved 
in the constitution of all social objects, categories and 
processes, when the latter are labeled as «structures» 
they defy all further effort into understanding their 
composition. The idea of «structure» has grown into 
an analytical-functionalist category into which events 
are fitted without question as to their provenance 
so that, in essence, whatever happens is attributed 
to the existence of «structure.»9 The absence of an
5. This is a necessary historical relation which entails the 
dialectic of interiority (conscious, active subjectivity) and ex­
teriority (materiality conditioned by and conditioning piaxis). 
Cf. CRD, p. 132, 146, 157 ff. Franco Fergnani suggests that 
Sartre’s idea here is in general agreement with the Marx-En­
gels notion of historical surpassing. He stresses, however, that 
Sartre carries this idea further because he starts from an «in­
terior» principle, that is, the definition of the dialectic from the 
'inside’ or from roan himself. In «Soggettività e materialismo 
in Sattre,» A ut Aut, 136-7 (1973), p. 79.
6. On the lack of an adequate Marxian theory of conscious­
ness, cf. SFAM, p. 32, 177-81; F. Fergnani, op. cit., p. 72. P. 
A. Rovatti, «Sartre e il marxismo strutturalistico», Aut Aut, 
No. 136-7 (1973), p. 47.
7. The «anti-dialectic» (or, dialectic «of passivity»), implies 
an equivalence between alienated praxis and wrought matter 
(inertia). Sartre further designates this sector of reality as the 
«pratico-inert». CRD, p. 154. F. Fergnani states that, by com­
parison to Sartre’s «pratico-inert», the idea of «structure» 
betrays a «teleological daltonism» because it denies the differen­
ce between the real existence of human ends and the fact that 
they necessarily or possibly, turn out to be illusions, op. cit., 
p. 83.
8. CRD, ibid. Cf. also, Sartre, «Sur moi-même», Situations 
IX, pp. 86-7.
9. Structuralism tends toward functionalism because it is 
not interested in the explanation of events but, rather, in the
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adequate theory of consciousness within the frame­
work of historical materialism cannot be compen­
sated for by the mechanical dismissal of the philo­
sophical problematic posed by the historical subject. 
The latter is neither a «reflection» nor an epiphenom- 
enon in history and to ignore it in such summary 
fashion is to misconstrue the meaning of human 
science—not to mention that of philosophy which 
is anything but «surpassed».1 It is correct to con­
sider talk about subjectivism as idealistic and 
abstract. But the fact is that man, who is indeed the 
most concrete historical entity, has grown into an 
abstraction for, on the assumption that he con­
stitutes a «known quantity,» the human sciences 
have hardly studied him.
Yet, if the social sciences were to accept the frame­
work of the phenomenological-materialist synthe­
sis, subjectivity, the starting point of phenomenology 
as «rigorous science,» would entail an altogether dif­
ferent meaning: as a temporal and transcendental 
relationship of men with their environment and their 
past and future, subjectivity becomes indistinguisha­
ble from objectivity for it is the foundation of all 
interhuman understanding and the premise of all 
scientific communication.2 In Sartre’s words:
Thus, in L’Etre et le Néant, what you could call «subjectivity» 
is not what it would be for me now, the small margin in an ope­
ration whereby an interiorization reexteriorizes itself in an act. 
But «subjectivity» and «objectivity» seem to me entirely useless 
notions today, anyway. I might still use the term «objectivity,» 
I suppose, but only to emphasize that everything is objective. 
The individual interiorizes his social determinations: he in- 
teriorizes the relations of production, the family of his child­
hood, the historical past, the contemporary institutions, and he 
then reexteriorizes these in acts and options which necessarily 
refer 1rs back to them. None of this existed in L’Etre et le 
Néant.3
«discovery of the necessity of the explained element (behaviour, 
object) in the structure.» J. Topolsky, «Lévi-Strauss and Marx 
on History,» History and Theory, vol. XII, No. 2 (1973), p. 
205.
1. Particularly in Althusser’s case, the desire to be scientific 
betrays an implicit fear of philosophy. Cf. For Marx (London: 
Penguin Press, 1969), pp. 125-7, 162. Claude Ambroise points 
out that this «inferiority complex of non-scientism» among 
structuralists results in the misuse of scientific formulae and in 
a naturalism which passes for materialism. Cf. «L’Idiot de la 
famille: una critica letteraria antistrutturalista», A ut Aut, No. 
136-7 (1973), p. 91.
2. All human experience and activity as well as scientific 
objectivity rely on the principle of «comprehension,» or Verste­
hen. The latter «is primarily not a method used by the social 
scientist, but the experiential form in which common-sense 
thinking takes cognizance of the social cultural world.» 
Alfred Schutz, «Concept and Theory Formation in the Social 
Sciences,» in Y. H. Jung, Existential Phenomenology and Poli­
tical Theory: A Reader (Chicago: Regnery, 1972), p. 95. Cf. 
SFAM, pp. 153-9; CRD, p. 160.
3. Interview with Jean-Paul Sartre: «Itinerary of a Thought,» 
The New Left Review, No. 58 (Nov. -Dec. 1969), p. 45.
Hence, as long as we are dealing with concrete in­
dividuals, i.e., with historical actors related to objec­
tivity on the basis of their intentionality, «subjectivity 
and objectivity are two moments of the same phenom­
enon.»4 In this connexion let us note that the notion 
of the «individual» has become easy prey at the hands 
of materialists who assign it (rightly) to positivist 
bourgeois ideology. Nevertheless we have tried to 
show that Sartre’s position points to an issue that 
cannot be bypassed either by historical materialism 
or by the social sciences in general.5 Phenomenology 
offers a radical mediation for both by concentrating 
on the individual as a consciousness objectively 
related to materiality (past and future) and to others 
through his body and needs. Any attempt to reduce 
the individual so conceived to a «statistical average» 
or to a molecule undergoing the «laws of nature» 
in Engels’ fashion,6 renders the notion of historical 
change totally unintelligible.
The individual, therefore, must be approached pre- 
categorically, that is, in momentary suspension 
(έποχή) and, thus, in abstraction from the economic 
and social institutions through which the social sci­
ences have so far identified him, though socially, 
the individual is never abstract:
I take «abstract» here in the sense of incomplete. From the 
point of view of particular reality the individual is not abstract 
(we might say that he is the concrete itself) but provided that 
one has already found the deeper and deeper determinations 
which constitute him in his own existence as a historical 
agent and at the same time, as the product of History.7
There are two trains of thought running through 
Sartre’s statement. First, as already indicated, he is 
saying that man has become abstract because he re­
mains unknown. The second and most important
4. Hwa Yol Jung, «An Introductory Essay: The Political 
Relevance of Existential Phenomenology,» in Jung, H. Y.,ed., 
op. cit·, p. xxvi.
5. A. Gramsci, for example, after stating that man exists 
in a society of other men and things which are not mechanisti­
cally or deterministically interrelated, he says:
«It is essential to evolve a theory in which all these relation­
ships are seen as active and in notion, establishing clearly 
that the source of this activity is man’s individual con­
sciousness, which knows, wills, strives, creates, because he 
already knows, desires, creates, etc. and conceives of himself 
not as an isolated individual but rich in the potentialities 
offered by other men and by the society of things of which 
he must have some knowledge.» From «What is Man?» The 
Modern Prince and Other Writings (New York: International 
Publishers, 1968), pp. 78-9.
6. Sartre devotes substantial sections of the Critique attacking 
Engels’ views from Anti-Dühring and the Dialectics of Nature. 
Cf. SFAM, p. 57, 87; CRD, p. 129 ff, 147, 168-9. From an 
almost endless list of works with views similar to Sartre’s, cf. 
E. Mandel, op. cit·, p. 103; E. Paci, op. cit., p. 290. G. 
Lichtheim, Marxism (New York: Praeger, 1955). pp. 234 ff.
7. CRD, p. 143.
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point is that phenomenology proceeds through the 
method of abstraction to reach increasingly concrete 
levels of reality.1 The phenomenological critique 
of historical materialism comprises, in a sense, a 
regression within a regression. Marx went backwards 
«from production to the relations of production to 
the structures of groupings... to the individual» 
worker.1 2 Sartre’s territory covers a «deeper» space 
which is logically prior to Marx’s, i.e., the itinerary 
from worker to man, from the categorical to the pre- 
categorical level. But though spatiotemporally regres­
sive, Sartre’s method relies on progression. That 
is, he starts from the man in order to reach the work­
er, «the historical man.»3 This implies a maximum 
«bracketing» of the real world (of categories) for the 
purpose of reconstructing the internal logic of the 
«life-world» and at all times «without being unfaith­
ful to Marxist principles» where they are pertinent.4 5
Hence, this progressive concretization consists 
of several stages. Sartre starts first with the factors 
affecting interiority and praxis in a minimally complex 
social setting, in order to ascertain the possibility of 
an initial «negation» in human history. In this con­
nexion, Sartre puts forth his theory of scarcity 
which, in turn, leads him to the theory of alterity 
(Γaltérité), i. e., a theory of consciousness in relation 
first, to scarce materiality and, secondly, to the «se­
rial» social formations that Sartre calls «collectives» 
(les collectifs). It is important to remember that in 
investigating the life-world of a simple social nucleus, 
and later the internal framework of class relations, 
Sartre is not «explaining» their genesis as historical 
events.6 Neither is he presenting them in necessary 
historical sequence at all times.6 In phenomenology, 
the inquiry into the constitution or function of events 
implies the reconstruction of the meaning of objec­
tivity as perceived by consciousness from its own 
experience. Hence, constitution is the structure of 
consciousness, the way it operates in creating mean­
ing out of its wordly experiences and in organizing
1. Cf. Marx’s statement: «In the analysis of economic 
forms, moreover, neither microscopes nor chemical reagents 
are of use. The force of abstraction must replace both.» 
Capital, 1. Cf. also, Paci, op. cit., pp. 410-4.
2. CRD, p. 143.
3. Ibid.
4. SFAM, p. 57. Cf. also Husserl’s statement:
«At the phenomenological standpoint... we 'place in brackets’ 
what has been carried out, 'we do not associate these theses' 
with our new inquiries; instead of living in them and car rying 
them out, we carry out acts of reflexion directed towards them, 
and these we apprehend as the absolute Being which they are. 
We now live entirely in such acts of the second level, whose da­
tum is the infinite field of absolute experiences—the basic 
field of Phenomenology.» op. cit., p. 140.
5. CRD, pp. 134, 153.
6. Ci. CRD, pp. 153, 155.
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and acting upon that meaning.7 Thus, when speaking 
of the proletariat, for example, Sartre says:
... Our intention will not be to define this particular class 
that we call the proletariat: our only goal will be to search 
for... the constitution of a class, for its function of totaliza­
tion (and detotalization) and its dialectical intelligibility (ties 
of interiority and exteriority, internal structures, relationship 
to other classes, etc.). In one word, we are not verging on human 
history, sociology or ethnography: we would rather claim— 
to parody one of Kant’s titles—to be laying the foundations 
of «Prolegomena to all future anthropology.»8
IV
Sartre’s inquiry into the role of scarce matter in 
shaping praxis is probably the most misunderstood 
aspect of his Critique: regardless of persuasion, his 
critics have construed scarcity as a substitute for the 
conflict of classes which a «critique of dialectical 
reason» has supposedly rejected. But, as already 
stated, Sartre begins by subscribing fully to historical 
materialism’s general description of history whereby 
socio-economic formations correspond to modes of 
production which, from the ancient to the capitalist 
type, divulge an intensifying division of labour and the 
final division of society into classes. The problem 
that Sartre has set forth concerns a different level 
of this proposition; a level which is historical in the 
sense that it is above all «logicai.» Namely, the ques­
tion is, if we grant that history in a series of «nega­
tions» among social strata and eventually between 
classes, where can we attribute the origin of inter­
human conflict? Or, is there an element in human his­
tory which can be said to have played a consistently 
negative role in socio-economic organization? In 
sum, is it not logical to suppose that the possibility 
for the eventual institutionalization of socio-economic 
rifts was inherent to our history since, from its in­
ception, social organization depended upon negative 
material circumstances, i. e., on scarcity?9
This is, in fact, the crux of Sartre’s theory of scar­
city which seeks to render intelligible the man-circum­
stances dialectic at a stage of human history where 
we cannot rightly speak, either of «economic contradic­
tions» and class struggles and, much less, of idyllic 
communal organization.10 Nonetheless, the recon-
7. Cf. E. Husserl, op. cit., p. 230. Natanson, M., Husserl: 
Philosopher of Infinite Tasks, pp. 94-5. Paci, E., op. cit., 454.
8. CRD, p. 153. My emphasis.
9. «By rendering to scarcity its importance, we do not re­
turn to, I do not know what, pre-Marxist theory about the pre­
eminence of the 'consumption’ factor, but we îeveal negativity 
as the implicit motor of the historical dialectic and we render 
it intelligible. In the midst of scarcity all structures of a deter­
mined society rest upon its mode of production.» Idid., p. 225.
10. Sartre attacks Engels’ romantic and un-substantiated 
19th-century ideas about the existence of non-alienated primitive 
societies. Ibid., p. 218 ff. Engels’ views in Anti-Dühring have
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struction of human intentionality under primitive 
conditions ought to yield the seeds of later historical 
stages. Hence the examination of scarcity searches 
for the phenomenological, not the causal origin of 
negativity in the form of scarce matter. For the way, 
that is, in which scarcity becomes sedimented in the 
historicity of consciousness to affect the motivation 
of praxes (their needs and means of realization) as 
Well as intersubjective relations.
In this context, Sartre reaches the following con­
clusions. First, the discovery of an «unco-operative» 
environment at the moment of praxis alters each 
man’s perception of the other(s) and renders each 
human a threat to all humans, hence, «inhuman.» 
In other Words, when scarcity is revealed in the course 
of praxis that seeks to satisfy need, all other similar 
and, therefore, equally human praxis acquires an 
inhuman structure.1 Therefore, scarcity alters the 
positive meaning that interhuman relations could 
otherwise have: others are only objects to be used 
or avoided, not subject-objects reciprocally helping 
and being helped.2 Thus, secondly, exteriority be­
comes the constituting agent for praxis because it 
provides consciousness with motivation and means 
in accordance with circumstances as perceived.3 
The third implication for praxis constituted by scarce 
materiality concerns the creation of an embryonic 
value system, a future «superstructure»: the other 
becomes bad precisely because he is human and, 
therefore, superfluous with respect to one’s subjec­
tive need, though necessary as a means to its reali­
zation. Sartre’s point here is that in order that values 
and ethical standards be eventually incorporated 
into ideological systems by organized society, 
their roots must lie in the most logically rudimentary 
conditions that could affect intersubjectivity:
What we are trying to show here is that all of the supposed 
superstructures are already contained in the infrastructure 
as structures of the fundamental relation of man to wrought 
matter and other men.... Not one idea, not one value, not one 
system would be conceivable if they were not already contained 
at all levels of experience and under vaiiable forms, in all the 
moments of activity and alienation....1
often been shown untenable, in contrast to Marx’s who, as late 
as in his Grundrisse, identifies (social) alienation with the be­
ginning of history. Cf. Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen 
Ökonomie (Berlin: Dietz-Verlag, 1953), pp. 79-80. See also E. 
Mandel, op. cit., pp. 178-80.
1. CRD, pp. 203-7.
2. Ibid., pp. 206-7.
3. Ibid., p. 212 ff. Sartre explains that scarcity has its own 
dialectic and still remains—-in a false and, thus, surpassable 
form—the organizational principle of today’s societies, in the 
sense that famines go hand in hand with overproduction. 
Yet, this «relative» scarcity cannot be understood apart from 
the existence of scarcity from the beginning of human history. 
Ibid., p. 213, 215.
4. Ibid., p. 303 n.
Hence, having started from strictly phenomenolog­
ical principles («material reality,» says Husserl, 
as the lowest formation remains in the last resort 
the foundation of all other realities and therefore 
undoubtedly the phenomenology of material nature 
holds a pre-eminent position5), Sartre reaches clas­
sical materialist conclusions. Scarcity is the principle 
of the most primordial mode of production which 
shapes human intentions and valorizations at the 
same time that it is being changed and eroded by 
praxis itself.6 In addition, scarce materiality furnishes 
the intelligibility for the onset of alienation from one’s 
product (man’s objectification) and from other men. 
When the conditions that human activity seeks to 
integrate toward objectifying need are such that the 
activities of all others reveal an actually limited field of 
action, the resulting product is other than envisioned. 
This is not to suggest that the outcome of praxis 
is in any way «inauthentic» but to stress that praxis 
produces what it can since its motivation and course 
are irrevocably tied to the meaning that consciousness 
reads into objectivity. Thus, this type of alienation 
(unrelated to exploitation) coincides with the expe­
rience of necessity: when «we understand that we have 
in effect realized something else and,» when We under­
stand «why, outside of ourselves, our action has been 
altered, we have our first experience of necessity.»7 
Nonetheless, the experience of necessity, that is, 
the realization that one’s action is irreversible, can 
only be revealed through the mediation of action 
itself. Scarcity has no meaning for nature without men; 
praxis alone can read negativity into its insufficiency, 
so that «alienation can exist only if man is action 
first.»8
V
The phenomenological description of the effect 
of scarce materiality upon a primitive life-world 
leads Sartre into examining the mechanism by which 
consciousness is constituted, i. e., how it understands, 
organizes and projects within scarcity as an objective 
condition. Thus, Sartre’s theory of alterity describes 
the internal constitution of the moment when man 
(praxis) can be said to make himself the product 
of material conditions. Therefore, alterity denotes 
the relationship that must hold among praxes as a
5. E. Husserl, op. cit., p. 389.
6. «There is, therefore, a dialectical movement and a dia­
lectical relation at the inside of praxis, between action, as nega­
tion of matter (in its present organization and from the point 
of a future reorganization), and matter, as the real and docile 
foundation of the on-going reorganization, as the negation 
of action.» CRD, p. 230.
7. Ibid., p. 282.
8. Ibid., p. 248.
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function of the meaning that consciousness derives 
from its lived experience.
In searching for a «logicai» explanation of the 
claim that circumstances make men, one must estab­
lish a necessary bond between, on the one hand, mat­
ter which has absorbed human labour and, on the 
other, materiality as the conditioning initiator of 
further need and praxis. Therefore, what is needed is 
a mediation capable of bringing out a necessary 
(though not causal) relationship between these two 
forms of materiality, and one which also encompasses 
the human presence as a social entity.
Sartre locates the answer in the insights provided 
by phenomenology’s approach to human existence. 
It is human subjectivity in its pre-categorical depen­
dence for meaning upon the social and material envi­
ronment that «reads» into the materiality just re­
shaped by praxis the orientation of all further action. 
Insofar as man both does and does not recognize 
himself in the past product of praxis, the necessity 
for changing a materiality that appears other than 
initially projected, endows materiality itself with qua­
si-human qualities: inertia, socialized by a multi­
plicity of human praxes, now poses for itself as the 
signifier of consciousness, i.e., as its supplier of 
meaning and direction, to impose upon praxes exi­
gencies that they perceive as their own.1 As a result, 
essentiality is transferred by consciousness on the 
side of materiality so that man, argues Sartre, acts 
not only as other but as any other: contained and 
motivated by the «needs» of this material framework, 
praxes are robbed of their specificity and unfold in 
alterity, that is, in hetero-signification where each 
is defined by another and the next by still another and 
so on as in the case of a mathematical series.1 2 In 
effect, as it is common phenomenological practice,3 
Sartre makes use of an analogy to illustrate the mean­
ing of alterity. He employs the mathematical theory 
of recurrence which is the relationship between the 
members of a series composing a Set or Sum. For 
a trivial example of recurrence, consider the Set Z 
comprised of number A, B, C... where if A=l, B= 
A+ 1, C = B -f- 1... and so on. Thus, in this Set 
each member is defined uniquely through its relation­
ship to4he others, i. e., those that precede and/or 
succeed it.4
Therefore, alterity, or a relationship of social re­
currence is the working principle at the inside of all 
«pratico-inert» structures, that is, of all social ob­
jects or situations where the scope of praxis and the 
range of its autonomy are already prescribed by
1. Ibid., p. 285.
2. Ibid., p. 334.
3. Cf. Alfred Schutz, op. cit., pp. 98-9, 106; H. Spiegelberg, 
op. cit., p. 673.
4. CRD, Ibid.
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materiality itself.5 This means that the material 
and intellectual milieu in which men find themselves 
is sustained by consciousness as an essential «whole» 
that praxes particularize, like numbers in a series. 
For, insofar as individual interest draws its orienta­
tion from a common condition, there is an internal 
equivalence among individual praxes such that, the 
intentionality of each is that of anyone and, at the 
same time, of no one.
VI
In the opening section of the Critique Sartre had 
already announced that recurrence must be the only 
relationship that can describe the disposition of 
praxes at the internal constitution of «collectives.»6 
Following the phenomenological grounding of recur­
rence in the notion of alterity as the structure of 
practical social existence, Sartre undertakes to exam­
ine its implications for a number of crucial «objects» 
such as classes, values, or the market. Since detailed 
discussions on collective objects obviously lie beyond 
the confines of the present essay, let us just see what 
Sartre has to say about the meaning of belonging-to-a- 
class (l’être de classe), particularly, the working class. 
The thrust of Sartre’s argument is that, whether we 
speak of a primitive social nucleus or of a contem­
porary social class, the semblance of social co-opera­
tion by no means effaces the structure of scarcity— 
however transformed—and alterity as its corre­
sponding mode of existence. The fact thatworkers may 
cooperate and appear united in their demands to 
employers does not mean that they have overcome 
alterity. As long as their cooperation aims at safe­
guarding their rights and interest qua workers, the 
schema of class is posited as a form of materiality 
that cannot be surpassed and, therefore, as one that 
circumscribes autonomous praxis.7 Workers’ soli­
darity entails a reciprocity which is «false» not for 
lack of sincerity, but because solidarity is limited 
by itself since it springs from a socio-economic order 
which actually allows for it. This does not mean that 
the class framework actually unites into identity 
all praxes comprising it but that the practical margins 
and possibilities for individuality are limited by a 
collective foundation.8
From this brief sketch of class existence it becomes 
apparent that Sartre’s formulation sharpens histor-
5. Ibid., p. 234 ff.
6. SFAM, pp. 76-80, 163-4.
7. CRD, pp. 264-98. Non-surpassability is the constiuct 
of consciousness when confronted with value systems as well. 
We can only point here to Sartre’s lengthy analyses on the 
type of alterity that sustains «idea-process» and «idea-exis» 
structures. Ibid., pp. 302-303, 343-6.
8. Ibid·, p. 304.
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ical materialism’s perennial problem of awakening 
consciousness to the fact that praxis is doing what 
it has already been made to do through the products 
of previous generations.1 Of course, this concerns 
the classic contradiction between «being» and «doing» 
which cannot be dealtwith here in an adequate fashion. 
However, Sartre’s notion of praxis which denotes 
man’s active and conscious relationship with the con­
cretely experienced material and social-world, fur­
nishes us with sufficient information for concluding 
that whether or not aware of this contradiction, every 
human life constitutes a surpassing, however partial. 
Yet, at the same time, as long as the more general 
and less immediate socio-economic contradictions 
persist, the structures they engender always seem to 
be a bit ahead of man, i.e., to be defining his general 
potential. Upon rare historical instances, men have 
indeed reversed this trend through real «group» 
action which we could not examine here. But Sartre’s 
analysis of the group demands special attention par­
ticularly in relation to facile ideas concerning social 
change and the new structures that it tends to gener­
ate.
1. Ibid., pp. 279-80, 286-306.
In essence, through the questions raised by phe­
nomenological methodology, Sartre demonstates that 
the complexity of the historical process goes much 
deeper than mechanistic and /or scientific tenden­
cies from any ideological camp would like to grant. 
Unless subjectivity and the real-world problems 
of consciousness constitute the starting point of 
all social and historical research, the meaning of 
«structures», «laws» or «contradictions» will re­
main unintelligible and, in the last analysis, irrele­
vant. For, once stripped of the problematic and 
dialectical relationship between consciousness and 
materiality, ideational and /or material structures 
can tell us nothing, either about their origin or about 
the transformations that they obviously perform and 
sustain through history.
In sum, the issues raised by the foregoing discus­
sion have attempted to show how Sartre’s usage 
of a historically oriented phenomenology illuminates 
the necessity for social science to concentrate on the 
philosophical problems created by concrete social 
existence. In this respect Sartre’s Critique contains 
no solutions: its most valuable contribution lies in 
its having called attention to the fact that man him­
self is the only possible foundation of History and 
of the human sciences as well.
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